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Environmental Sustainability and Services
in Developing Global City-Regions
Theodore Panayotou
Introduction
Global city regions have enormous advantages in terms of economies of scale and
conglomeration and ability to attract investment and to create jobs and wealth.  At the same time,
megacities, and even cities of moderate size, require continuous investment in expansion and
maintenance of a broad range of infrastructure and public services if they are to work efficiently
and to continue to attract investment and provide a satisfactory quality of life to their expanding
and increasingly demanding population.  Even in developed countries, providing adequate
infrastructure and public services to meet the growing demand and to ensure improving—or at
least not deteriorating—environmental quality has always been a challenge.
The faster rate of urbanization creates even tougher challenges for cities in developing
countries, which have fewer financial, human, and institutional resources to respond to the
growth.  The demand for infrastructure and public services quickly outpaces the supply, creating
an ever-widening gap between the two.  The result is urban slums and shanty-towns that lack
even the most basic of services: clean water, sanitation, paved roads, and electricity.
Compounding the failure of urban infrastructure and public services to meet the increasing
demands, traffic congestion, deteriorating water and air quality, and uncollected solid waste add
to the array of problems facing developing-country megacities.
State-owned utilities and other state enterprises providing these services often find
themselves strapped for lack of financial resources, unable to maintain or increase coverage and
access, despite—or perhaps because of—governments' efforts to provide subsidized services2
affordable to the poor.  Since most of the poor have no access to these services, the wealthier
urban inhabitants tend to be the main beneficiaries of subsidized water, power, and other
services.  Both subsidies and underpricing result in excessive and wasteful use by those who
have access and in failure to even cover the operating costs of existing services.  As a result,
infrastructure is not properly maintained and the quality of service deteriorates further, causing
users to be even less willing to pay for these services and to seek more reliable alternatives.
This, in turn, further deprives public providers of the badly needed revenues in a vicious circle of
ratcheting down to lower and lower quality of service that has come to be known euphemistically
as a low-level equilibrium trap.
The consequence of this trap is deteriorating environmental quality in cities, with dire
consequences for the health and productivity of millions of people who are exposed to harmful
pollutants.  Damage to property and traffic congestion further diminishes the net wealth and
welfare generated by megacities.  Yet, as long as the average level of services and job
opportunities in cities is better than that in rural areas, rural urban migration continues unabated,
putting further pressure on a system that is already unable to cope, totally overwhelming city
governments and other public service providers.  It is this inability to cope with the expanding
demands of growing urban population, along with the absence of negative feedbacks to reverse
the process, that is the greatest threat to urban environmental sustainability.
How does globalization (and its concurrents of liberalization and privatization) change
the sustainability picture in global city regions?  Globalization has the potential to make things
better by making available the necessary financial resources, technology, and management to
escape the low-level equilibrium trap.  On the other hand, globalization may make things worse
if it simply increases the demands on the already heavily burdened infrastructure and services3
and adds to pollution and congestion while continuing to make the megacities more attractive to
rural migrants because of increased employment prospects.  Indeed, this is what is happening to
most of the developing world's megacities, but there are also some bright examples of innovative
approaches to tapping globalization and putting it in the service of environmental improvement
and sustainability.  While developed-country cities as a group have been more successful in
marshalling outside resources to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks and to improve
environmental quality, they are not always a good example for developing countries to follow.
Indeed, in some cases, they may be a good example to avoid.
The purpose of this paper is (1) to analyze the environmental challenges of global city-
regions, especially in developing countries, where they are more severe; (2) to examine the
implications of globalization for these challenges; and (3) to explore public policy options,
private sector involvement, and innovative, flexible instruments for addressing these challenges.
We focus particularly on the Asian region, because it has been the most active participant in the
globalization "game."  Examples from Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Chile,
who have also been active participants not only at the national level but also at the global city
level, are also discussed.  Based on this analysis, the paper proposes a new paradigm for
environmental management of global city-regions, driven by the private sector and civil society,
with government playing a regulatory and facilitating role.
Economic Growth and Urbanization
Megacitites are the creation of the immutable process of urbanization, which is in part
derived from economic growth and in part from government policies.  As per capita income
grows, structural change from agriculture to industry also occurs.  In fact, the two processes are
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing.  What drives both economic growth and urban migration4
is the movement of resources from low-return activities (agriculture, rural) to high-return
activities (industry, urban).  The strong relationship between urbanization and GNP per capita for
selected Asian countries is seen in Figure 1.  Economic boom, accompanied by rapid
urbanization and slow growth in the supply of infrastructure and public services (including
environmental protection), has caused a precipitous decline in environmental quality, as seen in
Figure 2 for the case of the Bangkok global city-region of eight million people: urban
congestion, legendary traffic jams, anaerobic water bodies, clogging air pollution, and ubiquitous
uncollected solid waste mark Bangkok's golden economic decade, 1985-1995.
Urbanization and Environmental Quality: The Case of Asia
While the level of urbanization in Asia is considerably lower than that of Latin America,
it has been growing faster.  As a result, Asian cities are growing dirtier, noisier, and ever more
congested.  Particulate levels are twice the world average and five times the levels in other
developing regions. Ambient levels of sulfur dioxide (a precursor of acid rain and a major
regional pollutant that damages crops and materials) are 50% higher in Asia than in Latin
America (GEMS 1996), corresponding to Asia's higher rates of economic growth during the
1980s and early part of the 1990s.  Figures 3 and 4 compare selected Asian cities to selected
North American cities, while figures 5 and 6 show the sources of particulate and SO2 emissions
in one Asian global-city airshed. Although Asian emissions of CO2 (a global pollutant suspected
to contribute to global warming) are less than half of the world average in per capita terms, they
are growing at four times the world average.  Fecal coliform count and suspended solids in Asian
rivers are three to four times the world average, while surface waters in urban centers are replete
with pathogens, organic material, and heavy metals, exceeding national and WHO standards.
Thirteen of the world’s fifteen most polluted cities are in Asia.5
How well protected are Asians from this increasingly unhealthy environment around
them?  Despite the rapid, steady growth in income and wealth, one in three Asians still has no
access to safe drinking water, and one in two Asians has no access to sanitation services; only in
Africa is the situation worse. For those with access to public water supply, service is intermittent
and poor, averaging between four and fourteen hours per day, while system leakages exceed
40%.  At least one-third of a billion tons—and growing at rates of 3-7% a year—of solid waste
remain uncollected, becoming the breeding ground for disease vectors.  Millions of tons of
hazardous waste are disposed of untreated in dumpsites and landfills, threatening both
groundwater and the food chain.
What is the economic cost of environmental damage in Asia?  Is there effective demand
(willingness to pay) for environmental improvement in Asia?  What are the expected benefits
from different levels of environmental improvements, and how do they compare with the likely
costs?
While there are no comprehensive estimates of the costs of environmental degradation in
Asia, existing partial estimates indicate costs in the range of 2-10% of GDP, depending on the
comprehensiveness of the estimate.  For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has
estimated environmental damages in China in 1990 to be US $31 billion, or 8.5% of GDP, while
Smil (1996) puts the figure between 5.5% and 9.8% of GNP.  Far less comprehensive estimates
for Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines range between 2% and 3.3%.  The Indonesian
estimate of 2.0% includes only health effects of particulates and lead levels above WHO
standards in Jakarta alone: premature mortality accounts for 80% of the $844 million damages
from particulates, and IQ loss in children for 90% of the $1,320 million damages from lead
emissions (Ostro 1996). Table 1 shows estimates of social costs of different fuels in selected6
Asian cities.  A reasonable average figure for annual damages and production losses for the
typical Asian country would be around 5% of GDP.  There are also significant additional welfare
losses arising from damages to health, amenity, and existence value not captured by GDP losses.
Economic Growth and Environment
Environmental quality follows an inverted U-shaped curve during the course of economic
development.  It first deteriorates, during the industrialization process, and then improves during
the post-industrial stage, as the center of gravity of the economy moves from industry to services
(Panayotou 1993, 1997).  However, the environmental price of economic growth is in part
policy-determined.  It is generally higher when policies subsidize extractive industries, such as
capital-intensive industries, and inputs such as energy and water, when property rights are
undefined or insecure and externalities pervasive and unmanaged; and when institutions are
weak and enforcement is lax.  Since all these policy, market, and institutional failures have been
present throughout the developing world during the past several decades, it is very likely that
megacities paid an unnecessarily high environmental price for their economic growth.  While
economic growth generated the structural changes, demand shifts, and financial resources for
significant environmental improvement—especially in large cities such as Bangkok and Manila
that produce about 50% of national GDP—the institutions and policies were not in place to
ensure a supply response.
The Ineffectiveness of Current Policies
There is a general perception among developing-country policy makers that people are
not willing to pay for environmental improvements, even for such basic services as access to safe
drinking water.  There is accumulating evidence from surveys and from revealed behavior (e.g.,7
water purchases from water vendors and fetching of water from distant sources) that the great
majority of households, including the poor, are willing to pay the full costs of improved
municipal water supply and indoor sanitation, though not for outdoor sanitation.  Defensive
expenditures also indicate considerable willingness to pay for improvements in air quality.  For
instance, in the absence of access to reliable and safe public water supply, hundreds of millions
of Asians are buying water from vendors at 3-8 times the price of metered tap water (World
Bank 1992). Surveys have found that people in developing countries are as concerned about
environmental degradation as people in the developed world and are willing to pay higher prices
or to tradeoff growth for environmental protection.
Thus, while willingness to pay may be constrained by market and institutional failures, as
in the case of outdoor sanitation, the lack of effective demand is not a binding constraint on
environmental improvement.  There is significant unmet effective demand because of
unresponsive supply (see Figure 7).  The public sector has been unresponsive because of under-
appreciated benefits and perceived high cost, as well as because of institutional weakness and a
lack of funds.  Excessive centralization of environmental management, lack of public
participation, and institutional paternalism prevented individual and collective preferences from
influencing public decisions concerning the supply of environmental services.  Supply costs are
inflated by the choice of costly—and largely ineffective—instruments, such as end-of-the-pipe
command-and-control regulations, mandated best-available technologies, and centralized public
capital investments, rather than least-cost alternatives such as price reforms, pollution charges,
and decentralized provision.  For example, the end-of-the-pipe investment program for
controlling SO2 and particulates in China and India is costing 3 to 10 times as much as the least-
cost alternatives, because it focuses on power sector investments and ignores lower-cost8
alternatives outside the power sector, such as reduction of emissions from coal burning
households and industrial boilers.  The supply costs of environmental improvements are
compounded by the failure to take advantage of the wide variability in control costs among
sources and pollutants and to allow the flexibility of response needed to achieve least-cost
solutions (see Figure 8).
Environmental infrastructure, such as water supply, sanitation systems, solid waste
collection, and wastewater treatment, is severely underfinanced because of inadequate cost
recovery (itself the result of not charging users the full cost of supply), and a reluctance to
involve the private sector in order to lower cost and to leverage private capital.  The private
sector itself is unresponsive to the growing demand for improved environmental services because
it is either legally prohibited (natural monopolies) or unable to recover costs due to free-riding
(public goods).
Sustainable improvements can only be achieved through changes of behavior, which in
turn require changes of the incentive structure phasing individual economic agents as consumers
and producers.  As long as property rights remain ill-defined and insecure, as long as polluting
inputs and extractive industries are being subsidized, as long as polluters free-ride on the
environment and users of public services free-ride on the treasury, and as long as the dynamics
of private sector and the spirit of civil society are bureaucratically constrained from making their
full contributions, current trends cannot be reversed, and the gap between economic and
environmental performance will continue to grow.  Only a policy paradigm shift can put the
developing world on the fast track to environmental recovery that parallels its fast track of
economic growth.  The new policy paradigm involves less government bureaucracy, an enhanced
role for the private sector and civil society, and the aggressive pursuit of untapped win-win9
policy reforms and high-return investment opportunities that would result in both environmental
and economic gains: (a) phasing out of environmentally harmful subsidies, (b) cost-savings from
the use of economic instruments, and (c) environmental investments with high returns.
Problems with Publicly Operated Infrastructure
A major rationale and catalyst for increased private sector participation in infrastructure
and public sector provision has been provided by the poor performance and mismanagement
characterizing most publicly-owned and operated utilities.  Well-managed public systems are the
exception rather than the rule.  A combination of technical, financial, institutional, and
environmental problems of public service monopolies have resulted in unreliable service,
unsatisfied consumers, poor cost recovery and financially insolvent systems, unnecessary
environmental damage, and unacceptable health hazards.  The following problems have been
identified based on an assessment of public water supply and sanitation systems (Idelovitch and
Ringskog 1995) but apply at varying levels to other public services, such as power, telephone,
and transport.
(a)  Low-quality service and inadequate coverage (50-75% for water, 30-50% for sanitation);
inability to cope with expanding population; the intermittent, low pressure water supply
is mirrored in the power sector by frequent brown-outs and a variable electric current.
(b)  Inefficient operational practices and poor maintenance resulting in large water losses,
unaccounted-for water, and power losses as high as 40-50% (compared to 10-20% for
well-managed systems).
(c) Excessive and wasteful use. For example, water consumption may reach 500-600 liters
per capita, which is twice the norm in metered and well-managed water supply systems;
this is largely the result of water pricing, non-marginal cost pricing, and lack of metering.10
In the energy sector, underpricing leads to energy intensities (energy use per unit of
GDP) that are two to three times the norm for full-cost priced energy.
(d) Poor cost recovery and financial problems arising from underpricing, limited
consumption metering, irregular meter reading and billing not based on actual
consumption.  Water and electricity tariffs typically do not reflect the incremental costs
of future supplies, which results in inadequate funds for expansion.  Poor maintenance
resulting from poor cost recovery causes in a vicious circle of falling revenues and
deteriorating service.
(e)  High labor costs and low labor productivity because of excess staff, generous benefits,
and low skills.  For example, public water companies often employ 5-10 employees per
1,000 water connections compared with only two to three employees per 1,000
connections for efficient water companies.
(f)  Poor management and inability to attract management talent and qualified technical staff
due to non-competitive wages, political appointments, high turnover, lack of disciplined
labor force, and lack of incentives to attract qualified managerial and technical staff.
(g)  Large and growing state subsidies that benefit mainly the middle class and the wealthy
who are large consumers of water and power while the poor are either not connected or
too small users to benefit much from untargeted subsidies.
(h)  Lack of clear regulatory responsibility and conflict of interest between the regulator and
operator functions of the public utility.  Underperformance or undercompliance is often
dealt with by lowering standards rather than by improving operations.
(i)  Public service monopolies are usually among the largest sources of environmental
problems, for reasons that range from soft budget constraints and inefficiency to low11
tariffs and bureaucratic shielding.  Water and electricity tariffs rarely include
environmental costs.  For example, water rates do not cover the cost of collecting and
treating wastewater.  Moreover, the general lag of sewage connections behind water
supply connections results in sewage being deposited in septic tanks that contaminate
shallow aquifers, often a major source of urban water supply.
The poor performance and mismanagement characterizing most publicly owned and operated
utilities created the impetus for considering private sector participation.  A second and equally
important catalyst has been the increasing needs of urban infrastructure (power, water supply and
sanitation, roads, ports, telecommunications, etc.) and the inability of the public sector to
mobilize these resources.  A declining ODA, unsustainable levels of budget deficits and external
debts, and the need to maintain fiscal discipline to control inflation and spur economic growth
have convinced governments to seek private sector resources.
The Promise and Challenge of Private Sector Participation
The promise of the private sector lies in (a) improved management and higher efficiency
and (b) increased access to private capital for maintenance and expansion.  The two are related
since greater efficiency results in cost savings and greater availability of funds for investment;
improved management results in easier access to private capital; and investment of private
capital constitutes an added incentive for operational efficiency.
While the potential benefits from private sector participation are clear, the obstacles are
often formidable.  Infrastructure investments tend to be capital intensive and lumpy; have long
gestation and even longer payback periods.  For example, in water and sanitation, the ratio of
investment in fixed assets to annual tariff revenues is 10 to 1.  This means that private financing
is contingent upon the existence of long-term capital market and guarantees and rewards offered12
for high perceived risks.  The private sector risks are many and varied: demand for the services
provided may turn out to be lower than expected; tariffs may be too low and not permitted to
adjust to reflect costs; the condition of infrastructure may turn out to be worse, delays of
construction longer and costs higher than anticipated.   Other risks include the financial risk of
currency devaluation, legal risks in dispute resolution, and the political risk of asset
appropriation.  As a result of one or more of these risks, the private contractor may be unable to
recover costs and earn a reasonable profit.  Indeed, how these risks are quantified and mitigated
turns out to be the key to private sector participation in infrastructure projects.  The principle is
that whoever controls a particular risk best should assume it and be compensated for it.
The public sector that invites private sector participation in areas that have been
traditionally reserved for the state also faces risks: procured services may be substandard or costs
may turn out to be higher than those charged by the public utility.  There are also political risks,
arising from public opposition, especially by labor unions.  Water supply, sanitation, and power
(as well as other utilities) are natural monopolies; it is uneconomical to duplicate the water and
sewage pipes or the power lines in city streets, and, therefore, competition is difficult to achieve.
Moreover, regulation is necessary to protect against monopolistic practices.  Regulation is also
necessary to control externalities related to public health and the environment.  When the social
benefits exceed private benefits, investments must be promoted above what is privately
profitable.
The obstacles to private sector participation may appear formidable.  Lack of adequate
legislation for private sector involvement and non-enforcement of property rights and contracts
are common obstacles, as are bureaucratic inertia and lack of confidence in the private sector
among policy makers.  Other constraints include unfavorable public opinion, fear of foreign13
operations, and reluctance to deal with labor problems.  The constraints may also be on the
supply side, with the private sector showing too little interest to ensure competitive bidding.
Despite these obstacles a number of poor and middle income countries succeeded in attracting
private sector participation in urban environmental management through a variety of innovative
instruments (see Table 2).
Phasing out Distortionary Subsidies
The World Bank (1994) estimated that the cost recovery of urban water supply systems in
developing countries averaged 35%, imposing a fiscal burden of $13 billion a year.  Developing
country governments, like those of OECD, intervene heavily in their energy markets through
direct and indirect producer and consumer subsidies.  OECD energy subsidies are estimated to be
in the range of $60-75 billion (OECD forthcoming).  Larsen and Shah (1994) have estimated
non-OECD energy subsidies to be in the range of $270-330 billion in 1991, equivalent to 5-7%
of GDP.  China and India combined energy subsidies were put by the same source at $36 billion,
also in 1991.  There are no estimates for the whole region but a figure of $50 billion would be a
conservative estimate.  Petroleum prices in China in 1991 were 76% of world prices, in India
44%, while electricity prices were 37% and 54% respectively.  In Indonesia, petroleum prices
were as low as 37% of the world price.  Coal – Asia's dirtiest fuel – responsible for millions of
deaths and billions of damages a year, received an 18% subsidy in China and a 38% subsidy in
India.  Ingram and Fay (1994) estimated that avoidable power losses in the transmission,
distribution, and generation stages amount to $30 billion in developing countries or 0.6% of
GDP.
Subsidy removal promises large environmental benefits including reductions of NOx,
SO2, and CO2 and in the case of transport fuels reduction of congestion and particulates.  In14
addition, $3 billion can be saved from eliminating illegal connections and $2.5 billion from
increased efficiency of use resulting from full-cost pricing.  Full-cost pricing could save as much
as 30% of residential water consumption and over 60% of industrial consumption1 while repairs
to the distribution systems and elimination of illegal connections can save another 25% of water
supply (World Bank 1994).  In total, 50% of current water supply in developing countries can be
saved and used to supply the uncovered population with better pricing and demand management
and only modest investments in repair and expanded distribution systems.  With few exceptions,
no major investment in new sources of supply would be needed.
In Beijing, for example, 70 million cubic meters of water per year or 15% of current
domestic consumption could be saved through improved efficiency in public utilities, leakage
repair and recycling of cooling water used in air conditioning at the cost of $0.02-0.04 per cubic
meter.  Another 300 million cu.m. per year or 33% of current industrial consumption can be
saved by increasing recycling of cooling water in manufacturing and in power plants, at the cost
of $0.02-0.05 per cu.m. (World Bank 1992).  For comparison, the cost of the next lowest cost
water development project is $0.11 per cubic meter or more than three times the average cost of
water savings through efficiency improvements.  The savings equal $28 million per year and do
not exhaust the opportunities for water conservation and increased coverage through demand
management. At a price of $0.08 per cubic meter, installation of water-efficient toilets in
households and wastewater recycling in industry become profitable, saving additional quantities
of water, still at two-thirds of the cost of water from new water development projects.  Table 3
reports estimates of a 65% reduction in SO2, a 40% reduction in NOx, and a 7-18% reduction in
global CO2 emissions from removing subsidies in countries such as China and India.  Removal of
                                                          
1 Assuming a residential water price elasticity of -0.45 and an industrial of 0.9.  Bhatia, Cesti, and Winpenny, op.15
subsidies also removes the incentive to produce energy-intensive products and encourages the
production of more energy efficient consumer goods, resulting in further reductions in energy
use and air emissions.
The economic benefits from energy subsidy removal are also substantial.  Larsen and
Shah (1994) estimate that eliminating consumer subsidies of energy in non-OECD countries
would raise welfare by $35 billion.  Burniaux, Martin, and Oliveira-Martins (1992) estimate that
discounted real income would increase by 1.6% in non-OECD countries, real world income by
0.7% annually while the terms of trade would improve by 0.5% per year.  The major exceptions
are China, which is expected to experience an average real income loss of 0.7% per year, and the
oil exporters.  Hope and Singh (1995) present evidence from developing countries that raising
energy prices by removing subsidies does not harm competitiveness; GDP growth rates were the
same or higher than before the reform.  Furthermore, the removal of energy subsidies has public
revenue effects (higher public savings, lower deficits) that are supportive of economic growth.
While there was a small welfare loss for urban poor using commercial fuels, the overall
conclusion is that energy subsidy removal has not harmed the poor (Hope and Singh 1995).
Cost Savings from the Use of Economic Instruments
The very same environmental protection achieved today in Asia through the existing rigid
command-and-control regulations can be achieved at a fraction of the current cost, possibly a
third or lower, through a more flexible incentive-based system that combines economic and
regulatory instruments.  Indeed such an environmental policy reform is likely to be both
economically less costly and environmentally more effective as countries that make even a
partial move (Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Chile) discover.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
cit., report residential elasticities of -0.3 to -0.6 and industrial of -0.4 to 1.4.  These are very conservative estimates.16
The cost savings in moving from command-and-control to economic instruments or to a
mixed system can be demonstrated by comparing the costs of the existing combination of
discharge permits and fines on over-standard emissions to a full emissions charge system.  Based
on a sample of 260 enterprises in Beijing and Tianjin, China, with multiple water pollution
sources, for which abatement varied from 0-100% with a median abatement level of 70-80%,
Dasgupta et al. (1996) derived a marginal cost curve and determined the emission charge that
would achieve the current abatement rate for each pollutant.  Abatement costs were reduced from
$47 million to $13 million, a saving of $34 million from this set of enterprises alone, or a 70%
reduction from the command-and-control cost level.
The large cost savings from a shift from command-and-control regulations to least-cost
instruments is well-documented in the United States, where most studies show ratios of CAC-
cost to least-cost ranging from 2 to 22 (Teitenberg 1990). It is particularly notable that the
savings are greatest in the case of particulates, the developing world's most serious and
widespread air pollution problem.  Even if only two-thirds of the current cost of environmental
protection could be saved from a more efficient regulatory system, the effect would be
equivalent to that of tripling environmental expenditures under the existing system.
 The economic benefits of a more flexible and effective regulatory regime go beyond cost
savings to the enhancement of competitiveness.  A World Economic Forum survey of business
executives in 50 countries reveals a strong correlation between the flexibility of environmental
regulations and international competitiveness.  Countries that rank high in terms of
competitiveness, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Chile, and Norway, also rank
high in terms of the flexibility of environmental regulations, while countries such as Russia,
Venezuela, and Hungary that rank low in terms of competitiveness also rank low in terms of the17
flexibility of environmental regulations, at least as perceived by investors and business
executives (Panayotou and Vincent, 1997).
Environmental Investments with High Economic Returns
The environmental neglect, in the cities of the emerging world, during the take-off
process of economic growth left unexploited countless public investment opportunities that at
modest cost can yield large economic and environmental benefits.  The scope and magnitude of
these opportunities is exemplified by the following examples:
•  Water Supply: In Phuket, Thailand, increased access to water and improvement of service
would yield returns in the range of 14-300%.  The higher returns are due to the fact that
water shortage affects Phuket's lucrative tourist industry.  In Gujnamwala, Pakistan,
increased access to safe water would yield a 20% rate of return.
•  Energy efficiency improvements in electricity generation in Asia would result in savings of
$9-13 billion while similar improvements in residential and commercial energy use
(including electricity consumption) would result in net savings of $26-39 billion, not
including productivity gains from health improvement and reduced agricultural damages
resulting from reduced emissions (ADB 1992, Saunders and Gandhi 1994).
•  Pollution Control: Investment of $20 million to reduce of BOD discharges from the top 100
polluters in the Metro Manila area would result in labor productivity gains and reduced
fishery losses valued at $250 million.  Investment of $35 million in fuel reformulation to
reduce lead in gasoline and sulfur in diesel would result in productivity gains from avoided
illness and reduced damages to forestry and agriculture valued at $85-160 million (Table 4).18
Towards a New Policy Paradigm
It is generally recognized that environmental degradation in developing country
megacities has reached unprecedented levels, and it is likely to get worse.  It is appreciated that it
carries a heavy price in productivity losses, health costs, and human suffering.  It is also
recognized that it is easier to deal with these problems in a growing rather than a stagnant
economy.  The need for new legislation and new institutions is widely acknowledged as is the
general weakness of enforcement throughout the region.  A consensus is emerging that punitive
regulation would be less effective than a collaborative effort that encourages industries and
communities to set standards and guidelines for their members and to monitor themselves with
only spot checks by the regulators.  It is increasingly recognized that non-governmental
organizations and the civil society have an important role to play in environmental management.
It is also beginning to be recognized that consideration of benefits and costs in environmental
policies and projects is just as important as it is in economic policies and projects.
The emerging new policy paradigm is one of smaller central government and stronger
local and city-region governments capable of good governance and effective management (see
table 5).  It involves a far greater role for the private sector and civil society in the provision of
environmental infrastructure, public services, environmental investments, and even monitoring
and enforcement of environmental regulations, areas in which governments and bureaucracies
dominated in the past.  But this policy shift cannot take place in an institutional and legal
vacuum.  There is a need for enabling legislation and new rules of the game that would allow
greater flexibility of response and wider involvement of the private sector in the provision of
environmental services while protecting the public interest and accommodating distributional
concerns.19
At the same time, it is equally critical to strengthen the capacity of governments to set
priorities, to establish and clarify property rights, to undertake reforms and redeploy resources, to
introduce flexible yet consistently enforced regulations and economic instruments, to
competitively outsource services, and to design and carry out targeted interventions to achieve
distributional objectives at least cost.  The new policy paradigm envisages only limited and
targeted increases in public environmental expenditure, a major overhaul and redeployment of
existing resources to increase their efficiency and effectiveness, and considerable mobilization of
domestic and external private capital sources to finance the needed environmental improvements.
In order to achieve both environmental improvement and continued economic growth,
global-city-regions will do best to adopt the best available policy (BAP) rather than the best
available technology (BAT).  The best available policy is one that (a) minimizes the costs of
environmental protection by judicial choice of instruments and (b) gradually internalizes it to the
generators of environmental damage and/or the beneficiaries of environmental improvement.
The new policy paradigm leverages limited and targeted public environmental expenditures by
tapping the private sector and market competition to supply environmental infrastructure that is
least cost, self financed, and well maintained (see Box 1 on the Buenos Aires Consortium for
Water Supply and Sanitation).  Under this scenario, environmental expenditures can be kept
under two percent of GDP with less than half provided by the public sector.  Since public
environmental expenditures in the developing world are just under one percent, this scenario will
not involve substantial increase in the public expenditure on the environment but a significant
redeployment of exciting resources toward a more targeted and strategic portfolio (see Table 6
for investment and control actions relating to the environmental sustainability of global city
regions).20
Conclusion
Globalization brings unparalleled challenges and opportunities for global city regions
both in terms of wealth creation and environmental sustainability.  How the governance of the
megacities and of the countries of which they are part manage globalization will determine
whether they will be sustainable entities, fully integrated into the global economy while
preserving their individuality or will become an unmanaged sprawl of built-up areas imposing
externalities on each other and underpinning their long term sustainability and competitiveness.
To a considerable extent, this will depend on how much responsibility, authority, and
accountability as well as resources devolved from central governments to local governments the
private sector and civil society.  The experience of a good number of innovative cities in recent
years in both the developed and developing world provides grounds for optimism.21
Box 1. The Buenos Aires Concession for Water Supply and Sanitation
The Greater Buenos Aires water supply and sanitation system, operated by a public company (Obras
Sanitarias de la Nacion, OSN) was plagued through the years by problems common to public water
utilities throughout the developing world.  Coverage was only 70% for water supply and 58% for
sanitation.  The service was of poor quality and unreliable, while only 5% of the wastewater received any
treatment before dumping into natural water bodies.  Infrastructure was poorly maintained and
unaccounted-for water was as high as 45% of the water produced.  Water meters were installed at only
20% of the connections; meter reading and billing were highly irregular, and water consumption reached
400-500 liters per capita a daytwice the norm for metered and well-managed systems.  The public
utility was grossly overstaffed with 8,000 employees, or 8-9 employees per connection compared with 2-3
by efficiently operating systems.  At the same time, population growth and urbanization were expanding
the demand for additional coverage.  The costs of rehabilitation of the deteriorating system and expansion
to reach 100% coverage was estimated at several billion dollars over the next 20-30 years, which was
clearly beyond the capacity of both the utility and the state to mobilize.
In 1993, the government of Argentina privatized water and sewage services for Greater Buenos Aires as
part of a massive privatization program that began in 1990, with World Bank support, and included
virtually all public services and federally-owned enterprises such as electricity, telephone, railways,
airlines, roads, and ports.  The private sector participation option chosen for water and sanitation was a
30-year full concession that allowed the assets to remain under public ownership while the operation,
maintenance, rehabilitation, expansion, and wastewater treatment were transferred to a private
concessionaire.  After a successful process of preparation and bidding, the concession was awarded to
Aguas Argentinas, a consortium of foreign and local firms led by Lyonnaise de Feax-Dumez, that offered
a 27% discount to the prevailing public water tariffs.  Thus, competition was effective in reducing costs.
It also mobilized $4 billion over the life of the contract to meet the performance targets of the concession,
which include 100% coverage in water supply and 90% coverage in sanitation by year 30, a reduction in
the unaccounted-for water from 45% to 25%, and an increase in sewage treatment from 4% to 93%.  Over
the first five years alone, the concessionaire will invest $1.2 billion, or $240 million a year12 times
more than the historic annual investment made by the public utility in the last decade.  To regulate and
control the concession and protect the consumers against monopolistic practices, the government
established a regulatory agency, Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios  Sanitarios (ETOSS) with
participation of the federal, provincial, and local government with a budget of $8 million to be financed
through a user surcharge 2.7% of the water and sewage bill collected by the concessionaire.  The
regulatory agency also enforces water and effluent quality standards based on international norms
introduced prior to the bidding.
During the first three years of operation, accelerated rehabilitation of the system led to a reduction of
water losses from 45% to 25% and coverage increased by 10% with no increase in production.  The
population receiving sewage services increased by 8%.  Prices were reduced initially by 27% but
increased by 13.5% in 1994 to further accelerate rehabilitation as provided in contract clause; still, water
prices are 17% lower than those charged by the public utility.  The staff was reduced by 47% through
severance payments by the government and voluntary retirement program by the concessionaire.  Labor
productivity rose and new recruitment is now underway as the concessionaire is responding to increasing
demand for water and sanitation services.  The table below summarizes these improvements.22
Table 6                Impact of Greater Buenos Aires Water Concession_____________________
Indicator of Performance_____________________Change from May 1993 to December 1995
Increase in production capacity (%)      26
Water pipes rehabilitated (kms)                550
Sewers drained (kms) 4,800
Decline in clogged drains (%)      97
Meters upgraded and installed          128,500
Staff reduction (%)      47
Residents with new water connections          642,000
Residents with new sewer connections                                                                         342,000_______
Source: Aquas Argentinas.
While the overall experience has been clearly positive and the model is now being adopted by
other Argentine provinces and other countries in Latin America, there have also been teething
problems with regard to negotiations with the labor unions and regulation.  Indirect labor costs
remain high as the concessionaire continues to provide fringe benefits traditionally available to
civil servants.  The regulatory agency staffed with former utility employees finds it difficult to
give up the state’s day-to-day management role and focus on its regulatory and contract
enforcement role.
The successful privatization of the supply and sewage services in Buenos Aires contains many
important lessons for private sector participation in water and sanitation throughout the
developing world.  First, privatization must receive the endorsement of major stakeholders, enjoy
political commitment at the highest level, and be part of a comprehensive program of economic
reforms.  Second, political, technical, legal, commercial, and financial risks must be assessed and
alleviated through appropriate mechanisms.  Third, all available options for private sector
participation should be considered and the one best suited to the country’s political and cultural
conditions and the sector’s features must be selected; the assets need not be privatized to improve
efficiency and attract private capital.  Fourth, the regulatory framework and regulatory institution
must be established, and the technical and financial feasibility of the concession studied prior to
bidding.  The regulatory entity must be strong enough to regulate an experienced international
concessionaire.  Fifth, while adequate preparation and time should be allowed to ensure universal
bidding, eligibility should be confined to qualified bidders through a prequalification process.
Sixth, sensitive staff reduction issues can be effectively dealt with through attractive retirement
packages jointly financed by the government and the concessionaire.  A final lesson is that the
contract should be realistic and specific to minimize conflicts yet be flexible enough to allow for
adjustments for unforeseen or substantially altered circumstances.
Sources: Idelovitch, E. and K. Ringskog, “Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in
Latin America,” Washington: World Bank (1995) and Crampes C. and A. Estache, “Regulating
Concessions: Lessons from the Buenos Aires Concession,” in Public Policy for the Private Sector, World
Bank (Sept. 1996).23
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